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The financial crisis has put many of the European actors in situations where they 
have been able or even forced to take new roles. The constitutional issues involved 
have mostly been tackled at a relatively superficial level if at all and only by experts. 
Most of the actions that have created new roles have been based on more or less 
ad hoc decisions. It is already visible that while many of these decisions have not 
resulted in their intended consequences they have had a broad list of unintended 
and unforeseen consequences. In this paper, I will concentrate on the European 
Central Bank (hereafter ECB when referring to either the ECB or the ESCB as it is 
the decision-making body for both). It is naturally only part of the complex financial 
and institutional set-up involved in the financial crisis. However, it is also one of the 
clearest examples of the constitutional drift in roles and also a potentially unfortunate 
example of the unintended constitutional and other consequences of these ad hoc 
decisions. I will first discuss the original intended constitutional position of the ECB 
as defined by the constitutional principles of the economic and monetary union. 
Second, I will discuss the three potential roles of administrative bodies: expert, 
stakeholder and politician. I devote some special attention to the demarcation lines 
between the roles before turning to the new roles of the ECB. Finally, I will discuss 
these new roles from the constitutional law and control perspectives. It should not 
come as a surprise that constitutional control mechanisms envisaged for a limited 
expert role are hardly sufficient for the roles of a stakeholder or a politician. This 
also has implications for the democratic legitimacy of the institutions involved, the 
issue with which I will end my paper. In order to avoid misunderstandings, I am not 
proposing some specific model for the common central bank nor am I claiming that 
the current model is value free and based on purely scientific rationales. It clearly 
is not. However, discussions of the economic and political rationales and merits 
of various central banking models are totally outside the scope of this paper. I am 
simply taking the constitutionally stipulated model as given and trying to assess what 
kind of roles it equipped the central bank with from the point of view of constitutional 
control and legitimacy. To the extent that these roles are not deemed sufficient, the 
main route to remedy the situation should be Treaty changes. 
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I. Constitutional boundaries of the ECB
The constitutional boundaries for the common monetary policy and the ECB can be 
derived mostly from the legal provisions of the Maastricht Treaty that was signed in 
1992. The Treaty changes thereafter have not touched upon the legal or institutional 
set-up of the common monetary policy. However, the legal provisions need to be 
complemented by other relevant material in order to become understandable as 
a functional whole, a consistent set of constitutional principles. These materials 
include the general economic constitution and economic constitutionalism, the 
influence of the German Bundesbank as a model for the common central bank 
and the consensus on monetary economics that started to emerge from the late 
1970s onwards until the finalisation of the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s. 
However, a thorough analysis of the underlying economic, historical and political 
issues shaping the ECB’s constitutional position is not the purpose of this paper. I 
will limit myself to explaining the basic legal material and direct interested readers 
to my earlier work on the subject.1 On the basis of an assessment of the Treaty 
stipulations and the three sets of sources for legal analysis, it is possible to draw the 
key stylised facts concerning monetary policy and the key constitutional principles 
covering monetary policy and central banking in the EMU. 
Price stability plays a fundamental role
Price stability penetrates all provisions of the Treaties on economic policy. It plays 
a more prominent constitutional role than is the case with any other central bank. In 
the new consolidated Treaties, “provisions relating to the European Central Bank…
are set out in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)”, but 
still in the new Treaty on European Union (TEU) it is mentioned as an objective in 
Article 3.3 that “the Union shall…work for the sustainable development of Europe 
based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social 
market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress.” The objective of 
the Union is sustainable development based on both balanced economic growth 
and price stability. Even at the Union level price stability is not a means to achieve 
economic growth but is rather a parallel means to full employment and social 
progress. This prominent role of price stability is closer to the fundamental ordo-
liberal view of price stability as part of systemic choice and as a means to achieve 
social equality than it is to the more instrumental role of price stability in the anti-
inflationary economic paradigm. 
 As regards EU Economic and monetary policy, the same fundamental emphasis 
continues. In Article 119 of TFEU indent 3 stipulates that “the definition and conduct 
of a single monetary policy and exchange-rate policy the primary objective of both 
1 For example, in Tuori 2013.
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of which shall be to maintain price stability”. Hence both the exchange-rate policy 
of EU Council (Ecofin) and the monetary policy of the ECB are supposed to have 
price stability as the primary objective. Furthermore, all economic and monetary 
policy activities “shall entail compliance with the following guiding principles: stable 
prices, sound public finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance 
of payments.”(Article 119.3).
Concerning monetary policy and the ECB in particular, it is made very clear 
in Article 127 of the TFEU that the “primary objective of the European System of 
Central Banks (hereinafter referred to as ”the ESCB”) shall be to maintain price 
stability. Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support 
the general economic policies in the Union with a view to contributing to the 
achievement of the objectives of the Union as laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on 
European Union.” The provision is repeated in the statute of the European System 
of Central Banks and the European Central Bank. 
Smits points out that the primary role of monetary policy had fundamentally 
the same formulation in the draft of the Committee of Governors.2 It therefore 
also shows how central banks (the Bundesbank) wanted to be objectivised at the 
constitutional level. Central bank governors must have been forced to perform a 
balancing act between a very clear and unconditional objective and the ability to 
have more discretion in formulating their own objective in an ever changing world. 
The fact that a more one-sided objective was chosen and at a higher constitutional 
level than is normally the case with central banks, was the result of a German 
demand based on their more fundamental anti-inflationary background.3 It shows 
how stable prices are seen as part of the economic and social system choice 
rather than a question of economic optimisation and empirical research that needs 
to be revised when new evidence arises. For example, the statutes of the Federal 
Reserve System in the US or the Bank of England provide a less fundamental role 
for price stability.
Prohibition of public financing
The TFEU and the statute of the ECB make it clear that monetising public sector debt 
should not be an option in any event. Article 123 of the TFEU states that “overdraft 
facilities or any other type of credit facility with the European Central Bank or with 
the central banks of the Member States in favour of Union institutions, bodies, 
offices or agencies, central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, 
other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member States shall 
be prohibited, as shall the purchase directly from them by the European Central 
2 Smits 1997, 180–181. The Committee of Governors was an EU organ composed of central bank 
governors that prepared the draft statute for the proposed EU central banking system.
3 For a thorough description of the discussions, see James 2012, chapter 6–8.
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Bank or national central banks of debt instruments.” This is further elaborated in the 
ECB’s statute in article 21. Defining when to apply Article 123 was made by Council 
regulation,4 with the main emphasis on clarifying the process towards stage three 
of EMU. The regulation also pointed out in the preamble that “purchases made on 
the secondary market must not be used to circumvent the objective of that Article”.
The background for the prohibition is very clear. The history of central banking is 
full of examples where monetising, that is, financing government with the issuance 
of paper money, has led to the collapse of the currency or at least excessive 
inflation.5 Hence, the most important reason from the monetary policy perspective 
is to protect price stability, that is, achieving the primary objective.6 This need for 
protection could be seen directly by maintaining central bank control over the 
money supply but also indirectly by reducing central incentives to create surprise 
inflation to reduce the real value of accumulated government debt. 
In the European context, the prohibition has another role as well. It should 
protect Member States from accumulation of debt by the ECB and also protect 
the non-bail out clause of the TFEU (Article 125). If national central banks were 
allowed to continue or start practices where they could finance governments at any 
level, it would ultimately lead to assuming liability at the Eurosystem level.7 In this 
regard, the provision also aims at imposing market discipline on Member States, 
so that they cannot rely on privileged access to national central bank financing or 
to financing by credit institutions (Article 124).
One of the difficulties concerning the prohibition of public financing comes from 
the fact that central banks may need to use government bonds as instruments in 
the conduct of monetary policy. Government bonds are normally the largest, most 
liquid and safest asset class in a modern economy. Hence, there are a number 
of areas where using them has strong efficiency arguments. For example, using 
government bonds as collateral for monetary policy operations is a norm in central 
banking. The balance struck in Maastricht was based on a strict prohibition of 
purchasing bonds directly from governments, signalling that a creditor role towards 
governments was outside the scope of the common central bank. This was 
further elaborated in the associated regulation pointing out that it should not be 
4 Regulation 3603/93.
5 Issing 1998, 54–55.
6 Committee of Governors (Document 1669/1670), 25, according to Smits 1997, 289.
7 The ECB has also been very explicit on the prohibition. A legal Opinion (CON/2008/46) states: 
“The monetary financing prohibition, as defined in Article 101 of the Treaty, is essential to ensure 
that the primary objective of monetary policy, namely to maintain price stability, is not impeded. 
Therefore, the prohibition must be interpreted extensively in order to ensure its strict application. 
It is noted that, under Article 237(d) of the Treaty, the ECB is entrusted with the task of monitoring 
the compliance of the NCBs with the prohibition on monetary financing and, as pointed out in a 
recent opinion, it is important, in the case of emergency liquidity assistance supported by a State 
guarantee, to provide for appropriate legal safeguards in terms of central bank independence and 
compliance with the monetary financing prohibition.”
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circumvented via purchases from the secondary markets. Hence, the ECB should 
not have any role in financing Member States. 
Independence of the central bank 
The independence of the ECB (and also the ESCB) is one of the key elements 
of the common monetary policy framework. In the Treaty, this independence is 
safeguarded in a number of ways. Most importantly, according to Article 130 of 
the TFEU, neither the ECB nor NCBs “shall seek or take instructions from Union 
institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, from any government of a Member State 
or from any other body.” Similarly Union institutions and Member States should 
“respect this principle and not to seek to influence the members of the decision-
making bodies of the European Central Bank or of the national central banks in the 
performance of their tasks.”
In addition to this relatively general statement of independence, the TFEU 
and ECB Statute contain a number of provisions that are meant to safeguard 
independence. These include provisions for a special audit procedure, terms of 
office and other working conditions of the Executive board and members of the 
Governing Council. 
The area of independence is one of the key examples where the requirements 
coming from the (ordo-liberal) European economic constitution, the Bundesbank 
template and the economic consensus of the late 1980s happened to be mutually 
reinforcing at the time of the Maastricht Treaty. As explained in the previous chapter, 
a major development occurred in academic economics towards advocating central 
bank independence. This development was not by any means limited to the EU or 
European central banks. 
Central bank independence and the detachment of monetary policy from other 
parts of national economic policymaking was also one of the reasons facilitating 
EMU. Countries that previously considered monetary policy as part and even a 
subordinate part of national economic policy had been forced to give central banks 
independence in order to facilitate balanced economic development. Hence, for 
national economic policymakers, monetary policy was already “lost” even before it 
was transferred to the EU level.
Advancing and respecting the principle of an open 
market economy with free competition
Article 119.1 TFEU on economic and monetary policy emphasizes free competition 
by stating that “the activities of the Member States and the Union shall include…
the adoption of an economic policy which is…conducted in accordance with the 
principle of an open market economy with free competition”. The same is then 
repeated in article 127 on monetary policy with the addition of the phrase “favouring 
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an efficient allocation of resources”, which is then repeated in Article 2 of the statute 
on the objectives of the ESCB. 
This strong emphasis on an open market economy and free competition in 
all the actions of the common economic and monetary policy and particularly 
the actions of the ECB can hardly be questioned. Without engaging in debate on 
whether the Community is based on the assumption of one type of economic order 
over another, it is without doubt that the ECB has to obey a market economy based 
economic rationale in its own actions.8 In this regard, it could be stated that while 
the European economic constitution might still be interpreted in a neutral as well 
as in a more ordo-liberal way, the monetary policy part seems to be highly ordo-
liberal. 
What this means in practice is that the ECB should cross-check its decisions 
and objectives with the principles of a free competition-based market economy. 
This is particularly important with regard to the operational framework of the 
ECB. It should be designed in a way that has a minimal effect on the functioning 
of the free market economy.9 There were indeed a number of elements in the 
design of the ECB operational framework that could be partially explained by 
strict adherence to market principles. For example, the minimum reserve system 
is not fundamentally a market-based system as it is based on obligating market 
participants to make minimum reserve deposits in central banks. In the case of the 
ECB, it was decided that minimum reserve proportions should be kept relatively 
low and more importantly that they be fully remunerated. Somewhat paradoxically, 
this reliance on minimum reserves came directly from the Bundesbank template, 
but the ECB decided to be more market-oriented than the Bundesbank by having 
low, uniform and remunerated minimum reserves.10
Quite similarly, the main tool for implementing ECB monetary policy is the 
weekly auction. As soon as it was deemed possible, these weekly auctions were 
made as short as possible and with variable rate tenders instead of fixed rate 
tenders in order to have limited impact on the market mechanism.11 
A key element of this conformity of actions with free market principles is 
the provision that ECB lending should be based on adequate collateral. For an 
institution that by nature thrives on being in a position to lend to the banking sector, 
it is of the utmost importance that lending is safe. This is even more so because 
ECB lending aims at controlling liquidity conditions in the banking sector rather 
than at a commercial profit through an adequate pricing of risk. Indeed, the fact 
that the ECB does not in principle take any margin on its regular lending activities 
8 Smits (1997, 190–91) reached the same conclusion. 
9 This is also stressed by the ECB in The monetary policy of the ECB. Frankfurt: The European 
Central Bank, 2004, 72. 
10 Issing 2008, 120–122.
11 For example, in Issing (2008, 122–130) there is a good description of the decisions and early 
evolution of the ECB operational framework 
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makes it clear that lending should be as safe as possible. Otherwise lending would 
be a subsidy to the receiving bank and hence against free market principles. In 
the operational framework as defined by the ECB, the safety of lending is based 
on two principles. Firstly, this lending is to credit institutions that are supervised by 
national authorities and secondly lending is based on adequate collateral. In order 
for losses to occur, both the receiving bank must fail and the collateral must lose at 
least something of its value. 
A role limited to achieving pre-defined objectives and 
excluding areas needing political value judgements
The Treaty is very clear in allocating objectives and related tasks and mandates to 
the ECB (and Eurosystem). Apart from the primary objective and tasks enumerated 
in the Treaty (and repeated in the statute), the ECB is given very little leeway for 
expanding its role even with the consent of the Council. The most telling example 
relates to prudential supervision, which has often been part of the central bank 
mandate. Firstly, all explicit deviations or additions to the tasks of the ECB have 
been made very difficult. For example, conferring special tasks in the field of 
financial supervision of credit institutions requires a unanimous decision by the 
Council, and consultation with both the European Parliament and the ECB (Article 
127.6 of TFEU). Even this procedure does not allow similar tasks with regard to 
insurance undertakings. This shows that there are very strict barriers to expanding 
the tasks (and hence the mandate) of the ECB.
Secondly, it could be argued that the European economic constitution, in particular 
in its ordo-liberal reading, would limit the role of independent administrative bodies 
to pre-defined tasks that can also be controlled by judicial means. If it is seen that a 
given function is best organised as a non-democratic expert function, then it can be 
allocated to an independent expert organisation. As argued earlier, the assumption 
that monetary policy is such a function is indeed a key assumption behind the role of 
the ECB. Without taking a stance on whether that assumption is correct, it should be 
clear that it does not allow for any tasks to be transferred to an undemocratic body if 
that body does not fulfil the same assumption. Furthermore, it could be argued that 
original ordo-liberal thinking would also avoid any concentration of power, be that 
public or private: hence the preference for independent expert organisations with 
very clear tasks and mandates. In the case of the Bundesbank, it was also seen 
as part of the institutional arrangement that its tasks and objectives were relatively 
limited. That always made it clear what the primary task of the Bundesbank was. 
Another corollary of the limited role of the ECB is that it clearly excludes any 
role for redistributive elements in ECB policy, which has also occasionally been 
acknowledged by the ECB.12 This is obvious from the limited budgetary resources 
12 Speech by Trichet 2009.
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given to the ECB, but more fundamentally it stems from lack of a mechanism to 
make political value-based decisions. 
Defined strategy and operational targets
It might be considered somewhat surprising to find that a predefined strategy and 
operational targets could be seen as a constitutional principle. The enhanced 
importance of a pre-defined strategy in the case of the ECB stems from two 
sources. First, a defined strategy has an elementary role in the accountability of 
the ECB. With very limited means of controlling and making the ECB accountable, 
forcing the central bank to announce strategy beforehand gives some kind of point 
of reference. If there were no strategy or intermediate targets, it would be very 
difficult to say whether the ECB had performed according to its objectives and 
tasks or not. Public ex post hearing in the EU Parliament would easily become 
formalities and more direct accountability toward the people of the euro areas 
would be absent. Second, the Bundesbank was the first major central bank that 
started to define its strategy and (monetary) targets. A pre-announced strategy and 
intermediate targets played a very important part in the institutional set-up of the 
Bundesbank, as it facilitated the de facto independent role of the institution as well 
as public respect. Indeed, it probably created the perception that the Bundesbank 
was primarily accountable to the people of Germany rather than to the government. 
This was achieved by announcing its strategy and targets in advance and providing 
explanations afterwards if and when they were not achieved.13 Price stability has a 
fundamental role not only for the ECB and the Eurosystem but for the EU’s economic 
policy framework as a whole. There was no discretion left in the formulation of 
the primary objective, which shows how stable prices are a fundamental part of 
the economic and social systemic choice rather than just a question of economic 
optimisation based on narrow theoretical and empirical research. Hence, there are 
no situations where the ECB could compromise the primary objective or balance it 
with other objectives.
III. The main roles of the administrative 
organs (economic-political institutions)
In the following, I will explain the three main theoretical concepts I intend to use 
in order to analyse activities of central banks. These are the roles of an expert, 
13 The Bundesbank had so-called monetary targets, that is, targets for the growth rate of some 
monetary aggregates. For the credibility of the institution, it seemed to be less important to achieve 
the targets than to have them in the first place. Accountability is enhanced by the aim of achieving 
targets and by the need to explain why they were not achieved. 
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stakeholder and politician. They are hardly exclusive to central banking or even 
economic governance more generally. The theoretical concepts have a direct link 
to general governance theories at the national and transnational level. Hence the 
present legal study could draw on the legitimacy theories developed on those 
broader and more advanced areas of scientific inquiry.14 The term role is here meant 
to include a relatively wide set of elements, for example, the type of processes and 
information that are used, formal position as well as control and accountability 
techniques. 
Expert
In economic constitutional thinking, the concept of an independent expert is very 
important and the role of an independent expert is pivotal in a number of key areas 
concerning the actual conduct of the economic constitution. There is hence a 
crucial difference between an expert, a stakeholder and a politician, respectively.
 At the general level, the role of an independent expert has two pre-
conditions. First of all, there needs to be a strong belief that an expert is best suited 
to perform a given task in a society. Normally the type of function performed by an 
expert requires a specific kind of knowledge that is cumulative in an organisation. 
The elementary, main substance of the function also needs to involve applying 
scientific or quasi-scientific tools and information to specific cases. As is clear, 
modern societies are full of expert functions that are performed by publicly 
funded or organised organisations. As a rule, these functions are organised under 
ministries or in separate bodies with at minimum some top-level political control. 
The second, and more specific, pre-condition is the requirement to perform the 
task independently from outside influences, particularly political influences. In 
practice, an expert can often be and is expected to be independent. An expert 
does not need to or is not assumed to take into account issues outside his/her 
given field of responsibility. The input information is solely defined by the “scientific” 
needs of the process. However, the practical independence of an expert should 
not be mixed with the intentional or even formal independence of an expert. In the 
latter case, there is a perceived possibility or risk of political intervention, which is 
seen as harmful. Hence, a truly independent expert organisation should not take 
orders or even receive advice from, for example, political organs. In this regard, 
a formally and intentionally independent organisation is always an exception and 
hence needs strong specific reasoning to argue for its position. 
The purest examples of independent expert bodies include courts and competition 
authorities. In the case of the courts, the fact that they were given a constitutionally 
protected independent position is a surprisingly recent development.15 However, 
14 See, for example, Losada 2012 or Habermas 1961.
15 See, for example, Hayek 1960, 168–173
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nowadays it is obviously one of the elementary principles of the Rechtstaat that 
legislative, executive and judicial powers are separated. And even the much 
debated blurring between the roles of the executive and the legislative in the EU 
context has kept the independent expert position of the courts intact.
To assign competition authorities the role of an independent expert is an even 
more recent phenomenon. It is a particularly European or more precisely German 
ordo-liberal notion that the function of a competition authority is of elementary 
importance in maintaining the proper functioning of the economic system and 
ultimately a liberal society.16 In order for the competition authority to perform 
this important function it needs both a high level of expert knowledge and full 
independence. Without expert knowledge it is not able to apply its very specific 
rules to varying type of situations in a coherent manner. Independence must be 
guaranteed as the economic interest involved could be such that they would risk 
taking over the political system with harmful consequences for the economic 
system but more fundamentally also for the political system.17
The means to safeguard the independence of an expert are mostly legal and 
even constitutional. The most straightforward means to create a protected field 
of operation is to stipulate it in a written constitution. However, it is by no means 
the only one. Societies with longer tradition can have unwritten constitutional 
norms (England is the prime example). In addition, a protected independent expert 
position can also be achieved with the popular support of the people as was the 
case with the German Bundesbank, the notoriously independent German central 
bank. In the same vein, if an organ does not gain public support for its role and 
actions, its independent position will increasingly become more difficult to maintain 
in the longer term, even if it is formally protected in the constitution.
Hand in hand with an independent expert role is the constitutional control of the 
agent acting in that role, and the accountability of the independent institution. The 
control mechanisms for independent experts need to be designed in a specific way. 
On the one hand, control mechanisms should be such that they do not effectively 
remove the independence of the expert. On the other hand, they should make 
sure that the expert does not misuse the discretion he/she has been given. There 
needs to be effective juridical control of these activities, which is considerably more 
complex to organise than would appear at first sight. Actions must be such that 
they can be exposed to judicial scrutiny, which also demands that the underlying 
issues are such that there is a possibility to make straight-forward and rule-based 
judgements on them. In addition, there needs to be effective possibility and even 
responsibility to start legal proceedings against an independent organisation if 
there is any serious chance of it failing or exceeding its mandate. 
16 Of course, one should not underestimate the importance of the US tradition that facilitated the 
implementation of a German competition authority after the war.
17 This refers to the ordo-liberal nightmare of an interest group society that is well described, for 
example, in Eucken 1950/52. 
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In addition to judicial control, the second and possibly the most important means 
of control is accountability through the transparency and publicity of its activities. 
This again has more to it than would first appear. Actions need to be taken in forms 
that allow for effective transparency, not full publicity as such.18 Indeed, many of 
the functions that are assigned to independent experts are of such a nature that it 
is deemed that full publicity would not serve the best interests of the society, but 
that should not be misused to prevent the transparency of the institutions’ activities. 
It simply puts additional pressure on the institution to find effective ways to be 
accountable. Transparency is often deemed necessary for an institution to achieve 
its aims. It both facilitates public support for its activities and helps to guide the 
activities of the institutions’ addressees in the desired direction without recourse to 
more coercive means.
Stakeholder
There is a hint of arbitrariness in making a strong distinction between the roles 
of an expert and stakeholder. However, for the purpose of my analysis, the 
distinction is very important, because it is used to describe how influences other 
than “science”-based information force their way into the decision-making process 
of the independent expert. A stakeholder is commonly defined as a party that is 
affected by the outcome of decisions or events, and hence has something at stake 
in the process. Generally speaking this is not perceived as good or bad as such. An 
elementary part is that the driving forces of stakeholders are such that they have a 
vested interest in a given outcome. Indeed. A stakeholder’s influence can be seen 
as complementary to democratic legitimacy particularly in some areas of economic 
governance.19 
A stakeholder is different from the owner of the process. Broadly defined an 
owner is the core beneficiary of or responsible body for the process. For example, 
the ECB is the owner of issue of price stability in the euro area. In addition, price 
stability has a number of other owners as it has been assigned as an objective for 
EU economic policy. Furthermore, price stability has a broad list of stakeholders as 
public support by the people and companies in Europe is considered fundamental 
for price stability to upheld its position and to be achieved at a low social cost. 
Stakeholder-analysis is commonly looked at the owners or initiators perspective. 
The aim of the analysis is to reveal what important parties could and would be 
needed to be engaged in the project. It can also be used to define strategies or 
shorter term tactics on how to increase the likelihood of getting key actors behind 
18 Issing 2005, 65–83.
19 Losada 2012, 4–5. 
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a desired action or outcome. Taken from a completely different field,20 the matrix 
below is a simplified representation of how to classify potential parties by using two 
variables: the power of the stakeholder and the level of interest of the stakeholder. 
Obviously, a more accurate real life matrix would have more dimensions and more 
options within the dimensions with a loss of graphical simplicity.
Table 1. Stakeholder Matrix
An independent expert is normally not a stakeholder in a process. He/she is 
the owner of his/her own process, where he/she obviously needs to keep all the 
relevant stakeholders onboard. Using the table above for competition authorities, 
he/she needs to keep high-level political powers satisfied and the broad public 
involved with the provision of information about his/her activities and their positive 
impacts. In the case of the ECB, one could argue that it needs the support of the 
other economic agents in order to be able to perform its duties and hence needs 
to keep them satisfied to some extent. It also needs to keep the man on the street 
informed about its aims and also about the success it has had in achieving these 
aims. The Bundesbank has been considered particularly skilful in this respect, as 
it managed to convince the German public that monetary stability and the post-
war wirtschaftswunder were linked to and facilitated by a strong and independent 
central bank.
For the purpose of this analysis, the issue is whether the owners of some other 
processes have been able to engage the ECB as a stakeholder in their processes. 
There are at least two main suspects that I will discuss in the next section: (a) has 
the ECB become a stakeholder in the financial stability of the euro area banking 
system or even in the profitability of individual institutions and (b) has the ECB’s 
deep involvement and also financial exposure to single Member States deprived 
it of its ability to act as an independent expert vis-à-vis a Member State’s fiscal 
situation? In other words, has the independent expert role of the ECB become 
questioned by the potential roles of stakeholder in either euro area banking sector 
solvency or in Member States’ public finances or in both?
20 For example, the State Services Commissioner of New Zealand (see <www.ssc.govt.nz> and 
also the Department of Sustainability and Environment in Australia (see <www.dse.vic.gov.au> use 
this matrix to design Engagement Plans for their projects. 
Keep Satisfied Key Players
Minimum Effort Keep Informed
Level of Interest
Le
ve
l o
f P
ow
er
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Politician
The role of politician refers to an actor that makes political decisions, which for the 
purpose of this analysis have a few crucial features. First of all, political decisions 
contain value judgements. They are decisions that shape societies and give 
expression to their views on a broad range issues that by definition do not have a 
“scientifically” proven correct single alternative. In a democratic society, delegating 
value judgements to administrative organs, let alone independent authorities is 
highly problematic. Administrative organs obviously give physical appearance to 
those value decisions in individual cases, but should have only limited discretion in 
the actual formulation of such decisions concerning values. 
Second, at the core of political decision-making is determining how the tax 
burden is shared and how the proceedings are spent. For example, the German 
constitutional court has emphasised that parliament’s budgetary power is a core 
element of Germany’s self-representation.21 The contrary argument should make 
it clear. If we assume that any group of people was be subjected to unlimited 
financial liabilities without any say on the issue, we would use words like slavery 
or dictatorship rather than democracy. Indeed, in a modern liberal society, the 
majority of the self-representation of a nation takes the form of deciding about public 
expenditure and the allocation of the financing burden of the aggregate expenditure. 
That also includes the allocation of financing burdens between generations. The 
link between democracy and taxation is also reflected in the classical “no taxation 
without representation” slogan initially used by the Thirteen Colonies’ spokesmen. 
Thirdly, the role of politician includes an assumption that there is some kind 
of process to decide between conflicting views in an organised and, hopefully, 
open manner. The conflicting views should represent those of the people and the 
decision-making process should have some direct or indirect input from the people 
at best on equal terms. Here one elementary feature is that the process does not 
necessarily anticipate or have preconditions for the type of issues that can be 
tackled.
One could obviously start from a different perspective by taking political decision 
making as the basis for all public decision making and see them as acts of self-
representation of a given population or a state. Then all the deviations from the 
political role should be seen as exceptions to the rule that would require specific 
reasons. However, it is quite unlikely that we would have very different results if the 
procedure was reversed. For the purpose of my analysis, I find it more fruitful to 
focus on the core elements of the political role in order to find as much undisputed 
ground as possible.
The constitutional requirements for the political process are manifold and 
depend on the specifics of a given system. Without being exhaustive, I could 
mention that it needs to have continuous input from the people, and if that takes 
21 BVerfG, 2 BvR 987/10, 7 September 2011
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place via representative democracy, the mandates need to be renewed at relatively 
constant intervals. Obviously, for the EU there is the vast number of theories 
assuming various democratic input mechanisms, either through the EU parliament 
or through the Member States’ own democratic processes. 
IV. The new roles of the ECB
I have discussed the actual measures taken by the ECB elsewhere more 
thoroughly.22 In order to focus on the major substantive constitutional issues, I 
will only describe the stylised facts of the most interesting new type of actions by 
the ECB. They can be put into two groups according to the main concern of the 
action: actions concerning financial market crises and actions over fiscal crises. It 
is somewhat arbitrary to draw a line between these two types of actions, as many 
of the measures by the ECB since early 2010 could be explained by either form of 
crisis, which furthermore have become increasingly interlinked.
The broad list of action during the peak of the financial market crisis circled 
around means to resist the falling liquidity of the banking sector. Firstly, with the 
extensive expansion of the list of eligible collateral and the resulting variability in 
asset quality, the ECB has potentially become more exposed to the profitability 
variation of the banking sector. Obviously, this is also demonstrated by the fact 
that the ECB’s total exposure towards the banking sector has increased from appr. 
200 bln in mid–2000, and from 480 bln in mid–2007 to more than 1,400 bln as 
of the end of September 2012. While all this expansion, with the exception of the 
so-called Emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) by some national central banks, 
has nominally been simply liquidity provision and has as of now resulted in very 
marginal actual credit losses, it cannot be denied that the ECB has become a major 
stakeholder in the euro area banking system. This was further expanded with the 
creation of the European Systemic Risk Board under the organisation of the ECB,23 
which made the explicit distinction between monetary policy and supervisory policy 
responsibilities less clear and opened the door for further involvement of the ECB 
in the support operations of the financial sector, which are currently discussed 
under the heading of banking union.
The case with the link between the banking sector and the central bank is 
generally not very simple and straightforward. Modern central banks have always 
had close ties with the banking sector.24 Banking sector is the main channel through 
22 Tuori 2012. 
23 Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council 24/11/2010 on 
European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European 
Systemic Risk Board (the ‘ESRB Regulation’), and Council Regulation (EU) No 1096/2010 of 
17/11/2010 conferring specific tasks upon the European Central Bank concerning the functioning of 
the European Systemic Risk Board.
24 The US Federal Reserve was even initially founded to support banking sector liquidity.
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which central banks try to influence the supply of money and the liquidity condition 
of the financial system more generally. In the case of the ECB, the banking sector 
was intentionally made to be a debtor towards the ECB. This was guaranteed by the 
minimum reserve system, which forced banks to make minimum reserve deposits 
at their national central banks.25
Notwithstanding, or even because of, these close and substantial ties between 
banks and central banks of the ESCB, there was supposed to be a very clear 
distinction between the banking sector and the ECB. In real terms, the ECB was 
not supposed in any event to be involved in the provision of solvency support to the 
banks (i.e. capital support). Hence all the lending was to take place only against 
sufficient collateral and have short term maturity as a rule. The demarcation line 
between allowed liquidity support and prohibited solvency support is somewhat 
unclear en ante. And even ex post, it is possible that fully justified liquidity support 
results in credit losses and hence actual solvency support, and vice versa. This 
notwithstanding, the principle is very clear. No such situation should arise, where 
the ECB needs to concern itself with the fact that its monetary policy action might 
result in its own capital being eroded through losses incurred by banks. If however 
that did occur, the ECB would have become a stakeholder in banking sector 
profitability, which would be directly against the constitutional principles mentioned 
earlier.
The main actions of the ECB with regard to the fiscal crisis could be summarised in 
three groups. The first group consists of verbal interventions and other involvement 
in drafting the rescue plans of the Member States facing fiscal challenges and also 
in controlling the implementation of those plans. The involvement has exceeded the 
more traditional practice of commenting on the fiscal policy stance and even more 
often on fiscal sustainability, which was also part of the ECB’s approach from the 
start. Before the Greek situation, the ECB refrained from commenting on individual 
Member States and made sure that it did not get involved in the actual fiscal policy 
discussions of individual countries. However, as the Greek fiscal situation became 
worse and the country was being excluded from credit markets, the ECB became 
heavily involved in the rescue operations of Greece and of some Member States. 
The governor of the ECB Mr Trichet was also insisting that Greece was not allowed 
to default on its debts.
Second, the ECB changed its collateral policy for Greece and most likely 
engaged in large scale liquidity creation at abnormally long maturities to encourage 
market participants to invest in higher-yielding government bonds. Third, and most 
controversially, the ECB started its Securities Market Programme (SMP), that 
is, it purchased the government bonds of the countries facing fiscal hardships. 
The programme has been justified by monetary transmission arguments, which, 
25 See, for example, Monetary policy transmission in the euro area, a decade after the introduction 
of the euro. ECB Monthly Bulletin article, May 2010, and also Guideline of the ECB of 20 September 
2011 on monetary policy instruments and procedures of the Eurosystem (recast) (ECB/2011/14) OJ 
L 331, 14.12.2011.
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however, have raised more questions than provided convincing explanations.26 The 
claim is that there has been some sort of renationalisation of money and capital 
markets in the euro area with the result that monetary transmission differs between 
areas of the euro area. Most crucially, this differentiation could be fought by 
purchasing the government bonds of the troubled Member States. The programme 
was activated in May 2010 and closed by the end of Autumn 2012 with a total 
exposure of somewhat more than 200 bln euros. It has been replaced by the 
Outright Monetary Transactions programme that was announced in August 2012, 
which is similar to a large extent but makes conditionality and the link to adjustment 
programmes conducted by the euro area Member States by the EFSF/ESM a more 
explicit part of the programme.
How should these new ECB roles be assessed? It could be claimed that the 
safeguards that were designed for the ECB in the Treaty and also carefully respected 
in its initial operational framework have been eroded by its own decisions during 
the crisis. In the Treaty context two threats of this kind were tackled. First of all, 
the new central banking system was not to become a stakeholder in government 
finances and, secondly, it was designed to distance itself from the banking sector’s 
potential problems. In both of these regards, the ECB(ESCB) is unlike other central 
banks working in the nation-state setting, but is somewhat similar to the actual 
conduct of the Deutsche Bundesbank.
It is at the heart of the monetary policy part of the European economic 
constitution that the EU central bank was not supposed to have any responsibility 
for government finances at any level (municipal, Member State, or EU). This was 
safeguarded by the prohibition of central bank financing of governments, etc., by 
the requirement that all lending of the central bank should be based on adequate 
collateral. In addition, the central bank was assigned an extensive degree of 
independence: long fixed term assignments for management, its own primary 
objective that was also supposed to be respected by others, and a prohibition on 
seeking or taking advice from external sources.
The above-mentioned central banking stipulations of the public finances part 
of the European economic constitution were one side of the coin with the other 
side being the Member State’s responsibility for its own public finances. The latter 
obviously consisted, inter alia, of a no-bail-out clause and an excessive deficit 
procedure of the SGP. The central banking part was distancing the central bank 
from public finances at the Member State level and the other part was protecting 
the common monetary policy from the negative spill-over effects of reckless public 
finances. The ECB was not involved in the operational part of the SGP or any other 
disciplinary mechanism, because it would have made it a stakeholder in the public 
finances.
26 See, for example, the ECB press conference of May 2010 and press release on 10 May 2010, 
The ECB decides on measures to address severe tensions in the financial markets. 
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I have already made the point that there is a major risk that the ECB has been 
made a stakeholder in the euro area banking sector. With the massive increase in 
lending exposure and a simultaneous decline in collateral quality, the ECB would 
face potentially unbearable losses, if a large number of banks defaulted on their 
debts. As the ECB possesses two main elements of banking sector profitability, 
the provision of liquidity and setting the level of short-term interest rates, it is not 
irrelevant whether it can consider the financial difficulties of individual banks – 
primarily, private sector problems and, secondarily, a Member State’s problems 
– or whether it is in the front line being hit by those difficulties. My assessment 
would be that there is no longer a certainty that the ECB can function purely as 
an independent monetary expert, because of its stakeholder position vis-à-vis the 
banking sector.
The same analysis would seem to apply to the Greek and some other Member 
State’s fiscal problems. The ECB has clearly been made a stakeholder in those 
situations, as it has been involved in the actual rescue operations. Obviously, there 
is an increasing link between the banking sector’s problems and fiscal problems 
as the local banks have been “forced” to buy local government bonds with helpful 
funding from the ECB. However, it could also be claimed that the ECB has actually 
taken a political role in the fiscal crisis. The massive increase in indirect and even 
direct lending to Member States is effectively government financing, which is fully 
analogous to spending tax payers’ money. For example, the SMP programme and 
even more the OMT programme could, from the debtors perspective, have been 
exactly the same as funding Member States. This is further emphasised by the fact 
that the ECB has started to act like a creditor towards the countries in question. 
The letters sent to both the Italian and Spanish governments are a case in point. 
V. ECB constitutional controls and 
democratic legitimacy with new roles?
The constitutional structure for central banking in the euro area relied heavily 
on the model of apolitical expert function that could in the European economic 
constitution be assigned to an independent central bank. There are at least three 
crucial elements in that delegation of powers. First, the tasks assigned are deemed 
to be such that their operation can be controlled with dual means of juridical control 
and accountability, mainly through the transparency of actions. Second, functions 
and decisions containing value judgements could be excluded or at least be defined 
in a rule-based form that can then be assigned to an expert.27 Thirdly, and related 
to the previous two elements, the functions that are delegated to an independent 
expert body must be such that they can be defined ex ante relatively precisely. 
This means that the delegated process is well known and the outcomes of given 
27 Obviously this has been a contested perception of central banking.
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actions are known with a relatively high level of certainty, which would be in line 
with the technocratic model presented by Habermas. Obviously, there must be 
some ability to confirm ex ante democratically that the process description and 
objectives are preferred by the polity, preferably with a large majority. In particular, 
if the legitimacy discourse is primarily based on the liberal tradition, the role of the 
broad consent of the people would be highly supportive for the legitimacy of the 
independent guardian of monetary stability.
The demand for the above mentioned conditions are stricter if the delegation 
is made at a higher level, that is, if the position of the independent expert is 
constitutionally protected rather than a result of administrative action or normal 
laws. In the same vein, the more independent the expert function is, the more 
closely the delegation should follow the preconditions. Against this background, 
the demands for the delegation in a nation-state setting are looser than they are in 
a Treaty-based constitutional set-up such as the EU (or the euro area).
In the case of the ECB, I would argue that the delegated function largely fulfilled 
the criteria set above although with some arguably very demanding assumptions. 
The most crucial assumption was that the role of money and monetary policy was 
seen in a monetarist or in a German ordo-liberal perspective. There is also an 
interesting issue linked to Scharpf’s division of legitimacy discourses into liberal 
and republican, respectively. Namely, in the German ordo-liberal discourse with its 
narrow central banking model with the sole objective of ensuring monetary stability, 
the central bank could be seen as one main guarantor of the systemic choice for 
a free market economy and ultimately a free society.28 As a result, the euro area 
monetary environment was closer to an enhanced gold standard than a field of 
activist monetary policy. However, it would seem questionable whether all Member 
States realised this or subscribed to it, even if this is the way it was very clearly 
written in the Treaty of Maastricht. 
Concerning the narrow role of the central bank, one could argue that constitutional 
control mechanisms met at least some minimum criteria. However, a lot was left 
to the new institution to meet the requirements of transparency and accountability 
and also to exercise considerable self-restraint with regard to its actions in border-
line cases of its mandate. I have argued that this was well understood by the ECB 
when designing its monetary policy strategy and also during its first decade of 
operation. 
These constitutional control mechanisms seem to be struggling with its new 
stakeholder or politician roles. Transparency and accountability only work if the 
institution reveals all its influences and aims, and does not try to mislead the public. 
The main risk in this respect is that the institution continues to describe its actions 
according to the independent expert function although the substance of the actions 
is that of a stakeholder or a politician. That would effectively prevent those actions 
28 This is particularly well described in Eucken 1952 in which monetary stability is the first of the 
constituent principles of the economic order.
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from becoming exposed to public scrutiny. They would require even more than the 
pure expert functions due to their inherent value judgements.
In the unfortunate situation in which accountability through transparency of 
actions has become void, we are left with judicial control mechanisms. In the case 
of the ECB this is still mostly untested territory. However, I would think it highly 
unlikely that in the middle of the crisis, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) would, 
for example, order the ECB to narrow down its collateral list and to sell all the 
government bonds in its possession that it cannot justify on the ground of controlling 
short-term liquidity. In a recent Pringle case, the ECJ even failed to find any means 
in the Treaty to define monetary policy and showed quite a limited willingness or 
ability to engage in argumentation concerning monetary policy related issues.29 
More generally, juridical control and contested macro-economic policy choices 
make a poor match as the famous decision on the Stability and Growth Pact has 
also shown.
Hence, if we assume that the envisaged constitutional control mechanisms are 
not sufficient to correct the situation, we have to come back to the old question 
of democratic legitimacy and a given model of administration or governance. 
The complexity starts with the varying perceptions of legitimacy itself. Following 
Lord (2012) on the subject, there is, first of all, the empirical notion that relies 
on the acceptability of the use of political power. Without qualifying the concept 
of acceptability with some moral criteria, it is fundamentally a nihilistic (or even 
Schmittian) description.30 Indeed, often some notion of moral justification is added 
to the definition31 with a potentially detrimental impact on the preciseness and 
testability of the concept. The relatively easy and not necessarily uncomfortable 
way out would be to hold as a starting point that private persons are autonomous 
subjects that can judge for themselves what is acceptable and justified, and this 
becomes manifested in processes where these people can participate on an equal 
footing. This also justifies some form of coercive actions towards people as long 
as these actions and their rationales have been deemed justified by the same 
people acting as a polity.32 Obviously, this is no more than to say that democratic 
processes are the least controversial ways to find acceptable and justified, that is, 
legitimate forms of governance. 
If we define the criteria of legitimacy as something whereby people consider 
justified even decisions or administrative actions to which they are opposed, it is 
easy to see that some link to democratic decision making is close to essential. 
This would seem to hold even in cases where direct democratic mechanisms are 
not preferred due to time-inconsistency and prisoners dilemma type of situations, 
29 Case C-370/12 on the Council Decision 2011/199/EU.
30 Lord 2012,11 with a reference to both Beetham 1991 and Grafstein 2002.
31 For example, Buchanan 2002.
32 Habermas 1996, 67. 
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which are obviously also at the heart of delegating public power to independent 
experts. The same argumentation has been used to legitimise the whole approach 
of constitutionalising the main framework for economic action, namely, the 
economic constitution.33 
With regard to the EU, there are two additional issues involved in the legitimacy 
discussion. The first is question of legitimacy to whom, governments or the people 
of the EU. It seems clear that at least legitimacy in the eyes of or consent of the 
governments of the Member States is necessary. Without the consent of the 
governments (and national courts of justice), the decisions of the EU could not be 
implemented.34 A more difficult question is whether the EU needs to be perceived as 
legitimate by the people of the EU. Another issue concerning the EU and legitimacy 
comes from the fact that it is still founded by and based on international treaties. 
Hence original commitments of the Member States, their consent to the powers of 
the EU, have a far bigger role than in national political processes. Hence the “the 
notion of ‘no legitimacy without consent’ does seem to have a special significance 
for the European Union.”35
Much has been written about the democratic legitimacy of the ECB or the 
lack of it.36 It is clear that in the ECB’s conduct of monetary policy, there is no 
mechanism for democratic inputs to influence its action. Quite the contrary, as 
explained before, the ECB has been carefully protected from democratic inputs in 
the same manner as it has been from other undue influences. To conclude that the 
ECB has never been democratically legitimised, is not correct in my view. Here the 
reference to courts or competition authorities should be useful if not conclusive. 
Hardly anyone would consider the legal system lacking legitimacy on the basis that 
court decisions are not based on a democratic process but on expert knowledge 
and a protected independent reasoning.
The ECB’s relationship with legitimacy is based on a few elements. First of all, 
the most important democratic legitimatisation takes place at the time the system 
is decided upon. In the case of the ECB, its position is defined by the European 
economic constitution that was decided upon in the Maastricht Treaty concerning 
the supra-nationalisation of monetary policy. In the democratic processes of the 
Member States, the monetary order was constitutionalised to contain a certain type 
of objectives and institutional set-up. The second, and slightly more problematic form 
of legitimacy, comes from so-called output legitimacy. The system is considered 
legitimate as long as it provides the people of the euro area with the prosperity and 
economic stability it has promised.
33 Among the earliest proponents of the economic constitution, ordo-liberals, there was 
considerable variation in the emphasis of the democratic basis of the systemic choice. 
34 Scharpf 2007, 7.
35 Lord 2012, 21.
36 The vast literature can hardly be summarized here. Some well-known examples include: Verdun 
1999; Scharpf 1997; Moravcsik 2002; Majone 2001; and De Haan and Eijffinger 2000. 
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Both the systemic choice and output legitimacy deserve a fresh look after the 
series of events we have witnessed in the course of the last five years. In particular, 
the pre-conditions for an independent expert organisation need to be continuously 
met. If that was not the case, the constitutional control mechanisms would hardly 
be sufficient. Using the constitutional controls of an independent expert on political 
decision-making would not make any sense. There are simply no mechanisms 
to make value-based political decisions in a legitimate manner. In conclusion, if 
my fears are substantiated, the lack of democratic legitimacy of the ECB has also 
become a problem from the point of view of the European economic constitution 
due to the new roles of the ECB. By questioning underlying fundamental principles, 
this goes to the heart of the whole monetary order.
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